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I.  INTRODUCTION 
IN recent  years,  social  scientists  have  produced  studies  of  village  com- 
munities  in the  developing  areas which,  on the  one hand, exceed in 
scope the  classically  narrow  focus  of social anthropology,  while on the 
other  remaining more intensively  micro-level  than is traditional  for 
works  in political  science.  This new genre  is now large  enough to  war- 
rant  description  and appraisal. 
I should note at the outset  that  this essay is primarily  intended  to 
give structure  to the new literature  and not to criticize  it. In keeping 
with this  purpose,  I may be ascribing  greater  clarity  to some of these 
works  than  they  in fact  possess,  and I have occasionally  withheld  crit- 
* I wish to acknowledge the comments  of Morris Fiorina, John  Ferejohn, Morgan 
Kousser, Bruce Cain, Gary Miller, Thayer Scudder, and  David  Laitin. Particularly 
helpful  were the  comments  of Roger Noll and Samuel Popkin. I also want to acknowl- 
edge the financial  assistance  of the National Science Foundation (Grant NSF  4 SOC 
77-08573). 
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icism  where  it  is  in  fact  warranted.  I have  placed  greater  importance  on 
trying  to  impart  structure  and  coherence  to  this  new  literature  than  on 
trying  to  point  out  its  deficiencies. 
In section  II, I examine  the  central  issues  that  characterize  this  liter- 
ature,  and  note  a series  of  debates  that  run  through  it.  Taken in con- 
junction,  the debates  underscore  apparent  inconsistencies  which,  in 
section  III, I attempt  to  define  and  resolve.  I conclude  by  specifying  a 
research  agenda  for  this  emerging  subdiscipline. 
II.  THE  CENTRAL  CONCERNS  OF  THE  LITERATURE 
Micro-level  studies  are  characterized  by  their  attempts  to  analyze  the 
politics  of the  developing  nations  through  an examination  of local 
communities  (which  in the  cases  reviewed  here  are  rural  ones),  their 
environment,  and the relationships  they  bear to their  environment. 
More  explicitly,  the  studies  attempt  to  analyze  the  politics  of  the  devel- 
oping  areas  by  seeking  answers  to  the  following  questions: 
With  respect  to the  environment:  From the  point  of view  of the 
residents  of  the  rural  communities  in the  developing  areas,  what  fea- 
tures  of  their  political  and economic  environment  make  the  most  sig- 
nificant  impact  upon  their  welfare?  How can  this  environment  best  be 
characterized  ? 
With  respect  to  the  local  community:  What  are  the  most  significant 
features  of  the  structure  of  the  local community?  What  do its  mem- 
bers  want?  What  appears  to  determine  their  behavior?  In particular, 
what appears  to determine  the way in which  they  respond  to the 
dominant  forces  intruding  from  the environment  of their  commu- 
nities  ? 
With  respect  to  outcomes:  What  evaluations  are  to  be made  of  the 
development  process  on the  basis  of the  evidence  disclosed  in these 
studies?  And on what  grounds  are such  normative  judgments  to be 
formed  ? 
A. THE  ENVIRONMENT  OF  THE  RURAL COMMUNITIES 
The external  forces  that  appear  to  make  the  strongest  impact  on the 
local  village  communities  and  most  critically  to  determine  the  welfare 
of  the  people  therein  are  two  in number;  they  are the  state  and the 
market. 
Scott  examines  the  formation  of  the  colonial  order  in  Southeast  Asia, 
the  creation  of  new  institutions  and,  especially,  new  forms  of  local  ad- 
ministration  and taxation,  as well as the  resultant  disruption  of the 
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political  economy  of  the  villages.  He also  analyzes  the  spreading  com- 
mercialization  of agriculture  and the  move  to a cash-crop  economy, 
geared  to  production  for  the  world  market.  He relates  the  peasants'  po- 
litical  and  economic  behavior  to  their  attempts  to  maintain  their  well- 
being  in  the  face  of  what  they  experience  as uncontrollable  fluctuations 
in that  market;  in particular,  he focuses  on the  rebellions  associated 
with  the Great  Depression.  Similarly,  O'Brien analyzes  the rise  of 
French  colonialism  in western  Africa  and the  penetration  of world 
markets  into  the  Sahelian  countryside;  he too  identifies  colonial  inter- 
vention  and cash-crop  production  as the  major  exogenous  forces  de- 
termining  the  course  of  politics  in  the  area.  Dunn and Robertson  and 
Maxwell  Owusu  retell  the  story  in a Ghanaian  setting,  describing  the 
growth  of the  colonial  order  in this  small segment  of the British 
Empire  and  focusing  on  the  response  of  local  villagers  to  the  rising  de- 
mand  for  cocoa  in  the  world's  commodity  markets. 
Again and again,  micro-level  studies  designate  the state  and the 
market  as  the  sources  of  the  major  exogenous  shocks  that  set  social  and 
political  forces  moving  in the  rural  areas  and that  thereby  account 
for  much  of  the  political  activity  among  the  agrarian  population  of  the 
developing  nations.  What is particularly  interesting,  however,  is not 
the  existence  of  this  consensus;  rather,  it  is  the  debate  that  emerges  with- 
in  it  concerning  the  best  ways  in  which  to  characterize  these  forces  and 
the  nature  of  their  impact. 
One debate  centers  on  the  question  whether,  in  their  encounter  with 
these  external  forces,  rural  folk  are willing  accomplices  or passive 
victims.  Within  the  marketplace,  rural  dwellers  are  rarely  rich;  many 
of  the  benefits  of  their  exchanges  in the  world  market  are captured 
by others.  And within  the state,  rural  dwellers  do appear to lack 
power;  the  policies  of  states,  as recorded  in  these  volumes,  cannot  have 
been  constructed  with  their  interests  primarily  in mind.  Surely  then, 
they  ought  to be seen  as victims.  The thesis  of  victimization  is most 
strikingly  developed  by Scott,  who, as his main task,  examines  the 
moral  economy  of  the  peasantry,  which  he defines  in part  as "their 
working  definition  of  exploitation"  (p. 4). In  his  conception  of  peasant 
victimization,  Scott  is  of  course  joined  by  a host  of  others;  the  notion 
of  the  peasant  as victim  is a central  theme  in this  field.' 
And  yet,  a strong  countercurrent  runs  through  these  studies:  one  that 
1  Perhaps the best review and critique of this literature  is contained in Samuel L. 
Popkin, The  Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Change in  Vietnam 
(Berkeley and Los  Angeles: University  of California Press 1978).  The  book is also 
important  for the contribution  it makes to developing rational models of collective 
behavior  in peasant  society. 
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emphasizes  the  willingness  and  ability  of  rural  folk  to  manipulate  and 
exploit  external  forces-to  conjure  them  up,  even,  and  to  channel  them 
in  directions  that  redound  to  their  advantage.  Thus,  the  inhabitants  of 
Ahafo  (who  form  the  center  of  Dunn  and  Robertson's  study)  actually 
called  in  the  British  colonists  in  order  to  advance  their  cause  in  their 
political  struggles  with  the  Ashanti.  The  book  is  also  concerned  with 
the  energies  the  people  of  Ahafo  have  expended  to  mine  their  forests 
for  products  of  value  in  the  international  market.  Similarly,  the  Wolof 
peasants  studied  by  O'Brien  entered  into  a political  alliance  with  the 
French  so  as to  protect  themselves  from  the  slave  traders;  and  their 
efforts  to  promote  the  peanut  trade  in  Senegal,  and  to  influence  the 
locational  decisions  of  French  transport  planners,  constitute  evidence 
of  the  strength  of  the  capitalist  ethic  in this  supposedly  pre-market 
society. 
The  evidence  of  these  studies  thus  falsifies  any  notion  of  the  peasantry 
as  a  passive  victim.  The  problem  of  reconciling  the  poverty  of  the  peas- 
ants  with  their  proven  canniness  as  politicians  and  entrepreneurs  will 
therefore  continue  to  stimulate  debate  concerning  the  proper  charac- 
terization  of  their  encounter  with  the  political  and  economic  forces  that 
have  intruded  upon  them. 
A  second  debate  centers  on  the  proper  characterization  of  the  state:  Is 
it  a  monolith  or  an  arena  for  political  competition?  The  various  authors 
appear  to  be  fundamentally  inconsistent  in  their  own  minds  as  to  what 
the  answer  should  be.  Finucane,  for  example,  repeatedly  stresses  the 
lack  of  meaningful  political  participation  in  the  Mwanza  district  of 
Tanzania.  But  the  material  he  presents  in  his  discussion  of  the  role  of 
the  parliamentarian  suggests  that  real  resources  are  at  risk  in  the  polit- 
ical  system,  that  elites  compete  in  efforts  to  supply  these  resources,  and 
that  rural  dwellers  exploit  this  competition  in  order  to  elicit  material 
benefits  from  the  state. 
The  image  conveyed  by  O'Brien  is  even  more  inconsistent.  In  chap- 
ter  four,  he  documents  the  successful  monopolization  of  rural  markets 
by  the  state  and  its  consequent  ability  to  extract  surpluses  from  the  peas- 
ant  economy;  in  chapter  five,  however,  he  describes  the  spirited  political 
rivalries  among  the  national  elites  of  Senegal  and  the  enormous  diver- 
sions  of  public  resources  to  the  countryside  that  result  from  the  efforts 
of  the  rural  dwellers  to  exploit  these  rivalries.  Beckman,  in  his  sixth 
chapter,  reveals  a similar  ambivalence. 
Conflicting  evidence  thus  leaves  open  the  debate  concerning  the 
proper  characterization  of  the  state.  The  stakes  in  this  controversy  are 
high.  For  if  the  state  is  a monolith  and  is  impervious  to  the  wiles  of 
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the  peasantry,  a necessary  condition  is  fulfilled  for  a class  analysis.  But 
if  the  state  is  a competitive  arena,  the  peasantry  can  more  properly  be 
viewed  as one  of  several  interested  claimants  for  public  resources;  in 
that  case,  the  peasantry  is  an interest  group.  Depending  on  the  way 
in  which  the  debate  is  resolved,  then,  very  different  kinds  of  analyses 
and  normative  judgments  will  obtain.  In section  III, I entertain  a 
heretical  middle  ground  and  examine  the  possibility  that  the  state  can 
be  both  a monolith  (on  the  revenue  side)  and  an  arena  for  competitive 
politics  (on  the  expenditure  side),  and  I show  how  such  a realization 
clarifies  many  of  the  ambiguities  in  these  studies. 
The  last  item  of  controversy  concerns  the  proper  characterization  of 
the  market.  Again,  the  debate  tends  to  collapse  around  an  oversimpli- 
fied  set  of  choices.  On  one  side,  some  authors-in  the  case  of  the  books 
at  hand,  Scott  in  particular-tend  to  see  the  market  as  a milker  of  rural 
resources.  On the  other,  Owusu  and  Dunn  and  Robertson  view  the 
market  as a provider  of  material  benefits.  Naturally,  however,  the 
market  is  both  things,  for  it  is  an  arena  for  exchange.  In  the  literature 
at  large,  taste  and  ideological  predisposition  tend  to  determine  which 
side  of  the  exchange  receives  primary  emphasis.  As  the  debate  is  based 
so  largely  on  differences  in  values,  it  promises  to  be  interminable,  and 
will  therefore  continue  to  provide  a central  focus  in  the  field. 
B.  THE  LOCAL  COMMUNITY 
I.  Social  structure  and  resource  allocation.  The  first  set  of  questions 
focuses  our  attention  on  the  interactions  between  the  local  community 
and  its  environment;  the  second  set  leads  us to  search  more  closely 
within  the  village  setting.  Through  this  literature  we  are  introduced  to 
a highly  diverse  cast  of  characters  and  vigorously  conflicting  sets  of  in- 
terests.  Naturally,  there  are  the  peasants:  some  merely  subsist,  some 
produce  for  the  market,  and  some  alternate  between  these  roles.  Some 
have  large  farms,  and  some  have  small  ones;  some  own  capital  equip- 
ment,  others  do not.  Among  the  persons  without  farms,  the  landless 
laborers  are  the  most  significant.  There  are  traders:  some  sell  products 
from  the  city,  some  buy  produce  from  the  farm,  some  do  both;  many 
offer  credit.  There  are  religious  leaders.  There  are  headmen  and  chiefs. 
There  are  also  "strangers"  and  "sons  of  the  soil"-immigrants  and  cit- 
izens  of  the  local  areas.  Among  these  social  categories,  there  is little 
identity  of  interest.  The  scarcity  of  land  induces  'conflicts  among  them; 
so  do  questions  concerning  relative  prices  in  the  marketplace  and  the 
distribution  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  public  programs. 
Aside  from  concurring  on  the  diversity  of  interests  in  the  countryside, 
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the  authors  of  these  micro-studies  agree  that  social  rank  constitutes  the 
most  significant  dimension  for  differentiating  among  these  groups. 
Scott  distinguishes  principally  between  the  landlords  and tenants,  and 
the  patrons  and clients,  in Southeast  Asia. For Owusu,  Barrows,  and 
Dunn and  Robertson,  the  chief  emerges  as the  principal  elite  figure  in 
the  West  African  countryside;  for  Finucane,  it  is  the  bureaucrat  or  the 
prosperous  farmer.  To Western  minds,  O'Brien's  saints  will  no doubt 
be most  intriguing:  religious  leaders  of  the  Tijaniyya  sect  in Senegal 
who  combine  agrarian  wealth  with  political  savvy,  and  thus  emerge  as 
the  machine  politicians  of  the  rural  sector  of  that  nation.  All of  the 
authors  designate  disparities  in wealth,  power,  and social  status  as the 
primary  basis  for  the  diversity  of interests  in the  rural  areas  of the 
developing  nations. 
A major  issue  then  arises  in this  literature:  Does inequality-which, 
as  all agree,  exists-imply  exploitation  ? The answer  appears  to  depend 
upon  the  degree  of  competition  within  the  highest  stratum.  When  com- 
petition  within  the  rural  elite  is  constrained,  the  less  privileged  are  ex- 
ploited.  When  the  members  of  the  elite  have  to  compete  for  positions 
of  prominence,  however,  rival  claimants  for  elite  status  must  use  their 
positions  of  prominence  to  extract  and distribute  benefits  and thereby 
build  a following.  Competition  within  the  elite  thus  counters  the  po- 
tential  for  exploitation.  The contrast  between  the  period  of colonial 
rule  and  the  period  of  nationalist  politics  is  illustrative  of  the  importance 
of  these  considerations. 
In Africa,  colonial  officials  implemented  measures  that  curtailed  the 
degree  of  competition  for  chiefly  office.  In one  particularly  striking  il- 
lustration,  Barrows  shows  how the  British  invented  the  "traditional" 
rules  of succession  of office-rules  that  made the accession  to office 
contingent  upon  a genealogical  order  of  succession  rather  than  upon 
securing  the  support  of  a majority  in the  relevant  public  councils.2  A 
similar  pattern  prevailed  in  Southeast  Asia: according  to  Scott,  as com- 
petition  for  elite  positions  decreased  in the  colonial  period,  the  elites 
2 As a result  of  isolating  the  process  of  succession  from  the distribution  of preferences 
among the kingdom's citizenry,  the rigid rules of genealogical determinism  permitted 
the adoption of unpopular policies. Ironically,  while the rules were adopted in part to 
increase  predictability  in public affairs,  they  did in fact  lead to radical shifts  in public 
policy.  The rules  determined  who secured  office  but did not determine  what the office- 
holders'  policies  would be. Under more democratic  procedures,  of  course,  the  content  of 
policy  would be determined-it would be the  policy  of the  legendary  median voter; the 
winning candidate would be indeterminate-it  would be whoever selected  the median 
policy  position. See Phyllis  Ferguson and Ivor Wilks, "Chiefs,  Constitutions,  and the 
British  in Northern  Ghana," in Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime,  eds., West  African 
Chiefs: Their Changing Status Under Colonial Rule and Independence (New  York: 
Africana  Publishing  Company  I970),  326-69. 
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were  able  at  last  "to  realize  the  full  exploitative  potential  of  their  bar- 
gaining  power.  .  ." (p.  65)-a potential  which,  he  feels,  had  previously 
existed  but  had  never  before  been  fully  realized. 
The  colonial  period  was  thus  characterized  by  elite  cohesion  and  a 
movement  from  inequality  to  exploitation.  One  major  result  was  rural 
rebellion  and  the  participation  of  rural  dwellers  in the  mid-century 
nationalist  movements.  Their  prime  objective,  by  all  accounts,  was  the 
desire  for  access  to  resources  whose  allocation  was  controlled  by  the 
more  privileged  stratum;  as  a major  technique,  they  engendered  com- 
petition  between  members  of  the  rural  elite.  In Sierra  Leone  and 
Ghana,  for  example,  rival  factions  contested  for  chiefly  thrones;  many 
chiefs  failed  to  serve  out  their  full  terms  of  office;  and  all  contestants 
apparently  felt  compelled  to  deliver  benefits  in  the  form  of  jobs,  money, 
public  works,  or  legal  commitments.  In Senegal,  O'Brien  reports,  the 
followers  had strong  expectations  of material  benefits  from  their 
"saints";  "where  this  hope  is  consistently  disappointed,  in  the  last  resort 
they  may  (and  do) change  their  allegiance  to  a more  favorably  placed 
local  leader;  no  saint  can  afford  a record  of  failure  . . ." (p. I77).  In 
Southeast  Asia,  patrons  appeared  to  compete  for  clients  and  strove  to 
generate  benefits  with  which  to  secure  popular  backing.  Inequality  re- 
mained;  but  competition  for  privileged  positions  within  the  system  of 
rural  stratification  appeared  to  generate  benefits  for  the  relatively  dis- 
advantaged. 
In the  post-independence  period,  the  pattern  of  competition  and 
participation  took  place  in  the  face  of  public  policies  designed  to  dis- 
courage  it.  The formation  of  single-party  states,  the  administrative 
selection  of  local  government  leaders,  the  formation  of  bureaucratic 
monopolies  to  administer  the  trade  and  taxation  of  agricultural  prod- 
ucts-these  were  measures  through  which  Ghana,  Senegal,  Tanzania, 
and  other  states  sought  to  reduce  competition,  curtail  participation,  and 
thereby  achieve  the  ability  to  implement  policies  that  allowed  them  to 
appropriate  the  revenues  generated  by  the  peasants'  production.  It  is  not 
clear  how  successful  this  strategy  has  been,  either  in  constraining  par- 
ticipation  or in contributing  to major  income  transfers  from  the 
countryside.  The  present  studies  document  that  at  both  the  national  and 
local  levels,  competition  among  elites  persists.  They  reveal  the  tendency 
for  dissident  national  and  local  elites  to  form  alliances  and  to  compete 
for  support  in  the  rural  sector;  indeed,  the  analysis  of  these  alliances 
forms  the  core  of  Barrows's  and  O'Brien's  books.  The result  of  this 
competition  is the  distribution,  through  public  channels,  of major 
amounts  of  resources  in  the  form  of  credit,  jobs,  material  benefits,  and 
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public  works.  Rural participation  persists  and material  benefits  are 
provided  for  the  peasants-even  while  pricing  and taxing  policies  are 
implemented  that  violate  their  interests.  Official  measures  seek  to  con- 
strain  the  peasants'  ability  to  use agencies  of  political  participation  to 
oppose  these  policies.  Again,  the  conflict  between  the  images  of ex- 
ploitation  by  the  state  and its  provision  of benefits  remains  a major 
puzzle in this  literature. 
2. Models  of  peasant  behavior.  In focusing  scholarly  attention  upon 
the  rural  sector  of  the  developing  areas,  micro-level  studies  emphasize 
the  structure  of  rural  communities  and  illustrate  its  importance  to  the 
allocation  of  material  resources.  In adopting  a micro-perspective,  the 
authors  of  these  studies  also  tend  to  focus  upon  individuals  and indi- 
vidual  behavior,  albeit  often  while  using  the  family  or  household  as  the 
basic  unit  of  analysis.  They  employ  a variety  of  models  of  individual 
behavior.  The use  of  such  models  is significant  since  the  selection  the 
authors  make  among  alternative  representations  is  in  itself  informative; 
moreover,  the  use of models  makes  it possible  to relate  diverse  and 
seemingly  unconnected  areas  of  behavior  and  to  form  testable  proposi- 
tions. 
In explicitly  formulating  models  of  individual  behavior,  the  students 
of  micro-level  politics  make  a significant  choice  right  at  the  start:  they 
unanimously  discard  the  image  of  traditional  man that  has so often 
been  used  in the  development  literature.  The peasant  who would  fail 
to innovate  for  fear  of violating  some time-honored  practice;  who 
would  pass  up an  opportunity  for  individual  gain  out  of  regard  for  the 
welfare  of  the  larger  community;  or  who is so imbued  with  religious 
values  that  he  would  shun  the  attractions  of  material  progress-none  of 
these  figures  is  to  be  found  in  these  studies.  And  where  related  figures 
are  found,  as in O'Brien's  study  of  the  Mouride  brotherhood,  they  are 
treated  with  deep skepticism.3  Rather,  the  kind  of  rural  dweller  en- 
countered  in these  micro-studies  is a person  making  choices  out  of a 
regard  for  his  own  interests. 
3 It has been pointed  out that  Scott's  model does emphasize unwillingness  to innovate, 
other-regarding  behavior,  and shunning of material gain. True. But Scott's  model is 
one of individual rationality,  and it allows him to derive and to account for these 
kinds  of behavior.  He  attempts  to explain them,  rather  than positing  them  as inherent 
tendencies.  In this,  Scott differs  from  earlier writers  on "traditional  man," who built 
similar  behavioral tendencies  into their  basic model. Unlike his predecessors,  Scott is 
able to argue that under different  circumstances,  persons behaving in the risk-averse 
manner he describes  will no longer insure themselves  by observing  the norm of reci- 
procity,  etc.; when such behaviors  are built  into  the  model,  however,  there  is no latitude 
for predicting  that they  will change. Scott's approach can thus be considered to be 
qualitatively  different  from  that of his predecessors,  despite the apparent similarities. 
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Within  this  revisionist  position,  however,  there  are  basic  differences. 
For  Owusu,  the  appropriate  model  appears  to  be one  of  income  maxi- 
mization.  The desire  for  greater  income,  he argues,  led  the  peasants  of 
Swedru  (the  rural  area  which  he studied)  uncritically  to  embrace  the 
economic  opportunities  presented  to them  by the  world  market  for 
cocoa  and  to  engage  in political  action  in pursuit  of  material  gain.  In 
Ghana,  Owusu  notes,  "Political  power  was  not  sought  for  its  own  sake; 
even  Nkrumah's  'Seek  ye  first  the  political  kingdom'  was  only  a means 
to  all  the  good  material  things  which  'shall  be  added  unto'  Ghanaians. 
...  Political  relations  seem  to  have  had  no  meaning  except  in  terms  of 
property  and  wealth"  (p. I71). 
It  is  clear  why  Owusu  is  tempted  to  posit  income  maximization  as  an 
appropriate  objective.  In Swedru-as in Ahafo,  Senegal,  Mwanza, 
Burma,  and  Vietnam-many  of  the  fundamental  political  conflicts  do 
indeed  reduce  to  struggles  for  greater  income  and  for  the  resources  by 
which  it  can generate.  The price  of  agricultural  products  and manu- 
factured  goods,  the  level  of rents  and taxes,  the  provision  of roads, 
markets,  and  public  services-these  are  among  the  fundamental  politi- 
cal issues  in the  countryside,  and all gain  their  importance  primarily 
through  their  impact  upon personal  incomes.  In recognizing  the 
importance  of  economic  self-interest  in rural  politics,  and in positing 
that  people  make  choices  so as to  enhance  their  incomes,  Owusu,  Bar- 
rows,  and others  specify  a highly  plausible  approximation  of a valid 
model  of  peasant  behavior.4 
It  is  instructive,  however,  that  Owusu  repeatedly  appears  to  find  his 
model  of income  maximization  too confining;  again and again,  he 
slips  over  into  a model  of  utility  maximization  which  holds  that  the 
primary  objective  of  the  residents  of  Swedru  was not  greater  income, 
but  the  increased  satisfaction  they  would derive  from  the increased 
consumption  of  the  good things  of  life.  Indeed,  Owusu at one point 
contends  that  the  primary  goals of rural  dwellers  are "high  status, 
social  recognition,  and social  dignity"  (p. 5);  the  attempts  to gain 
increased  income  represent  attempts  to gain the  resources  through 
which  better  to  achieve  these  ultimate  objectives. 
The distinction  is important,  for  utility  maximization  and income 
maximization  constitute  sharply  different  models  and create  different 
expectations  about  how  people  will  behave;  we  should  be  able  to  choose 
between  them.  Do people  in  fact  surrender  opportunities  for  increased 
4 I have  used  this  model  myself,  and  am  therefore  subject  to  the  same  criticisms  that 
I will  make  of  these  other  works.  See Bates,  Rural  Responses  to Industrialization:  A 
Study  of  Village  Zambia  (New Haven  and  London:  Yale  University  Press  1976). 
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income  out  of  a regard  for  other  values?  Do they  work,  for  example, 
until  the  monetary  value  of  their  marginal  product  is  zero.?  Or  do  they 
place  a  positive  value  on  other  uses  of  their  time?  Can  they  be  compen- 
sated  for  losses  of  income  by  higher  office  or  enhanced  prestige?  Par- 
ticularly  in  the  area  of  politics,  the  models  create  different  expectations. 
Presumably  there  are  circumstances  under  which  an  income-maximiz- 
ing  politician  would  sell  his  policy  position  to  the  highest  bidder.  De- 
pending  on  his  preferences,  there  are  conditions  under  which  the  utility- 
maximizing  politician  would  refuse  such  bids.  If  he  derives  satisfaction 
from  holding  office,  he  would  not  accept  a bribe  to  adopt  a position 
that  would  threaten  him  with  loss  of  office.  Alternatively,  he  would 
refuse  a bribe  if  it  were  intended  to  secure  his  active  opposition  to  a 
policy  to  which  he  had  a strong  personal  commitment.  Owusu's  study 
and  others  suggest,  alas,  that  there  is  ample  opportunity  to  test  out  these 
divergent  expectations. 
Another  modification  of  the  income-maximization  model  should  be 
considered,  and  this  is  where  Scott's  book  makes  its  fundamental  contri- 
bution.  Alternatives,  and in particular  alternative  incomes,  do not 
present  themselves  with  certainty;  rather,  they  come  with  probabilities 
attached.  In  light  of  this,  Owusu's  initial  position  could  be  modified  to 
hold  that,  behaving  as income  maximizers,  rural  dwellers  would 
choose  among  alternatives  so  as to  maximize  their  expected  incomes. 
Scott  would  register  a sharp  dissent.  He contends  that  many  peasants 
cannot  really  afford  to  gamble.  They  are  poor  and  they  must  safeguard 
their  level  of  subsistence.  As a result,  they  would  choose  among  un- 
certain  alternatives  not  only  in  terms  of  their  expected  values  but  also 
in  terms  of  their  dispersions.  An alternative  which  has  a greater  ex- 
pected  payoff,  but  also  a greater  probability  of  driving  a peasant  below 
his  subsistence  level,  will,  according  to  Scott,  be  forsaken  for  one  which 
on average  promises  less,  but  which  would  guarantee  a minimum 
subsistence  level. 
Scott's  revision  of  the  income  maximization  hypothesis  succeeds  in 
some  areas  where  Owusu's  position  fails.  On average,  peasants  would 
do  better  monocropping;  instead,  they  often  tend  to  mix  their  crops. 
As  a  result,  they  often  do  less  well,  but  they  also  less  frequently  starve. 
On  average,  most  peasants  would  be  better  off  with  consolidated  fields; 
but  many  prefer  to  hold  scattered  plots,  each  with  a different  type  of 
soil.  Again,  the  result  is  a lower  average  income,  but  a hedge  against 
"downside  risks."  Instead  of  specializing  in  cash  crops,  most  peasants 
devote  part  of  their  resources  to making  subsistence  gardens,  thus 
lowering  their  average  income  but  insuring  themselves  against  starva- 
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tion.  These  and  many  other  well-known  features  of  rural  economic 
behavior  defy  a model  based  upon  the  maximization  of  expected  in- 
come;  but  they  conform  to  the  expectations  generated  by  a model  of 
utility  maximization  that  makes  allowances  for  an aversion  to  risk.5 
When  applied  to  agrarian  politics,  the  notion  of  risk  aversion  is  also 
useful.  Clearly,  peasants  do organize  politically  in efforts  to  transfer 
risks.  Farmers  everywhere  have  favored  government  guarantees  of 
minimum  prices  and  the  public  subsidization  of  the  risks  of  farming; 
in  the  United  States,  the  public  has  paid  an  enormous  price  to  fulfill 
these  demands.  Moreover,  as Scott  argues,  peasants  appear  to  prefer 
variable  as  opposed  to  "straight  line"  taxes;  progressive  taxes,  for  exam- 
ple,  may  levy  more  on average,  but  they  are  forgiving  of  peasants 
laboring  near  the  subsistence  margin.  And  peasants  have  repeatedly 
sought  political  intervention  to  modify  contracts  that  threaten  to  drive 
their  members  below  a guaranteed  subsistence  level,  be  they  mortgages, 
tenancy  agreements,  or  the  investiture  of  private  rights  on  public  com- 
mons  (Scott,  29ff.). A model  of  risk  aversion  clearly  offers  insight  into 
the  political  as  well  as  the  economic  behavior  of  peasants. 
Scott's  model  thus  holds  great  promise.  But  it  must  be  handled  with 
some  caution.  When  taken  to  an  extreme,  it  does  break  down.  And, 
although  one  may  agree  with-and  applaud-this  model  in  its  essentials, 
it  does  seem  incomplete. 
Scott's  model  cannot  be  interpreted  to  imply  that,  if  an alternative 
poses  any  finite  probability  of  going  below  subsistence  level,  it  will  not 
be  chosen.  When  taken  to  this  extreme,  Scott's  model  would  suggest 
that  peasants  make  no  use  of  information  regarding  relative  probabili- 
ties,  and  it  would  predict  inaction.  Rather,  the  model  must  be  construed 
as  stating  that  peasants  will  prefer  those  alternatives  which  offer  the 
5 At  this  point  we may  note  that  Scott  and  many  others  are  guilty  of  a major  error. 
Peasants,  it  is contended,  seek  to  keep  the  external  market  at arm's  length  and to use 
only  local  markets;  for,  it  is  held,  the  external  market  is  subject  to  uncontrollable  fluctua- 
tions.  It is true  that  fluctuations  cannot  be controlled  in the  larger,  external  market; 
but  they  will  be  smaller.  If  it  is  risks  that  the  peasants  seek  to  avoid,  they  should  there- 
fore  prefer  to  trade  in larger  markets. 
The reasons  the  fluctuations  will be smaller  are as follows:  concentrating  on the 
supply  side,  say  that  the  primary  determinant  of  the  level  of  supply  is the  occurrence 
of droughts.  The larger  the  market,  the  greater  the  chance  that  at least  some  sup- 
pliers  will  be  spared;  products  can then  be moved  into  areas  where  they  are  relatively 
scarce  and  therefore  command  higher  prices;  this  movement  will  continue  to  take  place 
until  the  products  command  the  same  price  everywhere,  save  for  the  cost  of  transport. 
The  result  of  the  movement  of  goods  is thus  a dampening  of  the  rise  in prices.  Where 
the  market  is  small,  however,  the  chances  are  greater  that  all suppliers  will  be affected, 
and  no  movement  of  goods  could  reduce  the  rise  in  prices.  Although  this  extreme  case 
is rare,  insofar  as it is approximated,  price  rises  will  be greater.  If they  prefer  small 
fluctuations,  peasant  consumers  would  then  prefer  larger  markets. 
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lowest  probability  of  driving  them  below  a particular  income  level.  If 
his  analysis  is  to  be  useful,  probabilities  must  feature  in  his  analysis. 
Moreover,  Scott's  model  should  not  be construed  as arguing  that 
peasants  will  minimize  the  probability  of  falling  below  subsistence  at 
any  price.  For  we  know  from  O'Brien's  study  that,  when  the  expected 
returns  become  sufficiently  high,  the  Wolof  peasantry  did  specialize  in 
cash-crop  production;  moreover,  they  accepted  the  risks  of mono- 
cropping.6  And  Beckman's  study  reveals  that  the  Ghanaian  peasants 
refused  in  I954 to  take  a  four-year  guaranteed  price  for  their  cocoa  when 
the  guaranteed  price  was  below  what  they  expected  the  world  price  to 
be.  The  levy  proposed  by  the  Ghana  Government  would  have  smoothed 
the  farmers'  income  streams;  however,  it  depressed  their  average  in- 
comes,  and  Beckman's  account  shows  that  the  farmers  therefore  resisted 
it.  In  other  words,  the  evidence  suggests  that  peasants  evaluate  alterna- 
tives  in  terms  of  both  moments  of  the  income  distribution.  If  the  mean 
of  one  is  high  enough  relative  to  the  other,  even  risk-averse  people  may 
prefer  it  despite  the  fact  that  it  may  have  a higher  variance;  for  the 
advantage  in  its  expected  value  may  more  than  offset  its  disadvantage  in 
terms  of  the  greater  probability  it  offers  for  a low  return.  Scott's  model 
thus  becomes  invalid  if  it  is  construed  as  meaning  that  only  the  variance 
counts. 
It  must  be  noted  that  Scott  does  not  take  either  extreme  position, 
although  he  occasionally  comes  close.  But  his  model  does  contain  one 
flaw  which  is  closely  associated  with  the  last  point:  it  fails  to  predict 
that,  for  a very  high  return,  peasants  will  in  fact  gamble.  What,  for 
example,  could  have  been  more  of  a gamble  than  to  join  in  the  very 
revolutions  he  describes?  Did not  the  movement  into  the  unoccupied 
lands  of  Chochin  China  represent  a gamble?  Is  not  urban  migration  a 
gamble?  The  fact  that  peasants  do  rebel,  resettle,  and  migrate  suggests 
that  a model  of  pure  risk-aversion  is  not  a valid  one.  Rather,  on  the 
evidence  presented,  it  should  be  modified  to  approximate  a  model  of  the 
Friedman-Savage  type:  one  that  posits  a utility  surface  with  risk-averse 
properties  at low  income  levels,  and  risk-preferring  ones  at higher 
incomes.7 
3.  Discussion.  These  models  are  important  because,  in  their  simplicity, 
they  are  general;  areas  that  are  conventionally  regarded  as  unrelated, 
such  as  cropping  patterns  and  revolution,  can  be  related  to  each  other 
6 Reports  indicate  that  the  Senegalese  peanut  farmers  consume  imported  rice.  I am  in- 
debted  to  Bruce  F. Johnson  for  this  point. 
7 See  Milton  Friedman  and  L. J.  Savage,  "The  Utility  Analysis  of  Choices  Involving 
Risk,"  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol. 56 (August  1948), 270-304. 
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and  subsumed  under  a more  comprehensive  analysis.  They  are  rela- 
tively  powerful;  through  the  use  of  evidence,  we  can  falsify  them.  And 
they  allow  the  beginning  of  the  construction  of  theory  in  this  area  of 
developmental  politics;  that,  to  my  mind,  is  what  the  enterprise  is  about. 
While  obviously  applauding  the  introduction  of  models  of  individual 
choice  into  this  literature,  I must  express  one  major  reservation.  It  is 
appropriate  that  I do  so  within  the  context  of  this  section  of  the  paper, 
for  my  objection  pertains  to  the  relationship  between  social  structures 
and  individual  preference.  The  point  is a simple  one:  there  is a gap 
between  collective  and  individual  behavior  that  is  treacherous  and  must 
be  crossed  with  great  care.  While  we  may  agree  with  Scott,  for  example, 
that  peasants  are  risk-averse,  we  would  be  on  shaky  grounds  indeed  if 
we  agreed  with  him  that  they  therefore  develop  social  institutions  for 
minimizing  risks. 
There  are  several  reasons  why  we  cannot  simply  attribute  the  proper- 
ties  of  rural  institutions  to  the  preferences  of  the  peasants.  As with 
most  of  us,  so  with  the  peasants:  especially  where  people  have  the  same 
preferences,  in  a world  of  scarcity,  individual  interests  must  conflict. 
We therefore  cannot  assume,  as Scott  appears  to,  that  peasants  can 
simply  agree  upon  a set  of  social  institutions  to  secure  their  common 
objectives.  Moreover,  there  is  little  reason  to  suppose  that  rational  indi- 
viduals  can  attain  socially  rational  outcomes.  In instances  where  the 
free-rider  problem  exists,  social  and  individual  rationality  will  in  fact 
conflict;  unfortunately  for  the  argument  of  Scott  and  others,  it  is  pre- 
cisely  in  the  realm  of  politics  that  this  problem  is  paramount.  Finally, 
even  if  social  institutions  were  in  some  way  expressions  of  the  values  of 
society's  members,  the  preferences  of  the  individuals  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  explain  the  existence  of  any  particular  institution.  To  cite  an 
example  that  is  not  all  that  far-fetched,  given  current  policy  proposals  in 
Ghana:  futures  markets  and  extended  families  both  are  means  of  insur- 
ance;  and  knowing  that  Ghanaian  cocoa  farmers  are  risk-averse  would 
not  explain  why  they  take  recourse  to  the  one  but  fail  to  employ  the 
other.  For  a variety  of  reasons,  then,  it  is  not  wise,  and  it  is  probably 
wrong,  to  imputethe  properties  of  social  institutions  to  the  preferences 
of  society's  members,  as  Scott,  for  instance,  repeatedly  does  in  his  work. 
How,  then,  should  we  proceed?  The  best  way  is  simply  to  avoid  such 
reductionism.  Institutions  and  individual  preferences  should  be  inde- 
pendent  elements  of  equal  standing  in  the  arguments  we  wish  to  ad- 
vance,  and  by  combining  information  about  both,  we can seek  to 
explain  collective  outcomes.  For  example,  knowledge  of  the  rules  of 
landholding  can  be  combined  with  information  concerning  the  risk- 
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averse  tendencies  of  peasants  to show  how  they  insure  themselves 
against  climatic  variation.  Or  our  knowledge  of  the  rules  of  genealogi- 
cal  succession  can  be  pooled  with  information  concerning  the  peasants' 
preferences  to  explain  succession  to  chiefly  office,  and  thus  the  choice 
of  public  policies  in rural  settings.  Clearly,  we are  better  off  with 
models  of  individual  behavior  than  we are  without  them.  But  it  is 
also  certain  that  we are  on  sounder  ground  when  we  combine  such 
models  with  information  concerning  social  rules  and  institutions  than 
when  we  seek  to  treat  social  structures  as  "expressions"  of  the  values  of 
the  individual  members  of  society. 
C.  NORMATIVE RESPONSES 
Finally,  this  literature  is  concerned  with  formulating  normative  judg- 
ments.  Having  examined  the  encounter  of  rural  dwellers  with  the 
forces  of  the  market  and  the  state,  the  authors  seek  to  judge  the  outcome 
of  that  engagement.  In particular,  they  share  a deep  interest  in the 
normative  implications  of  two  central  phenomena  in  the  development 
process:  the  use  of  coercion  and  the  rise  of  inequality. 
As  the  books  make  clear,  the  rural  dwellers'  encounters  with  the  state 
are  often  unpleasant.  In  particular,  governments  can  compel  villagers, 
through  a variety  of  devices,  to  surrender  resources  for  the  purpose  of 
financing  public  economic  programs.  Coerced  savings-in  the  name  of 
development-are  a prominent  feature  of  the  peasants'  encounter  with 
the  state;  they  give  rise  to  important  questions  of  ethical  justification. 
In principle,  the  role  of  coercion  in the  amassing  of  savings  for 
economic  growth  should  pose  few  ethical  difficulties,  for,  in theory, 
people  would  vountarily  consent  to  be  coerced  to  save  in  order  to  maxi- 
mize  their  own  satisfaction.  To secure  the  largest  feasible  stream  of  per 
capita  income  over  their  planning  horizon,  and  thereby  to  maximize 
their  welfare,  the  members  of  a society  must  save  and  invest  at  a rate 
that  insures  that  objective.  But  the  welfare  of  future  generations,  which 
all  supposedly  value  to  some  degree,  possesses  the  properties  of  a public 
good.  As  a result,  no  matter  how  large  the  value  placed  on  the  welfare 
of  future  members  of  the  society,  the  optimal  rate  of  savings  and 
investment  could  be  chosen  in  a decentralized  manner  only  under  an 
extremely  implausible  set  of  assumptions.  Coercion  is  thus  inherent  in 
the  development  process,  and  people  could  reasonably  agree  to be 
coerced  to  save  so  as  to  attain  higher  levels  of  satisfaction.8 
8 See,  for  example,  the  argument  presented  in Stephen  Marglin,  "The Social  Rate  of 
Discount  and the  Optimal  Rate  of  Investment,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics, Vol. 
77 (February  I963),  95-IIl. 
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In reality,  of  course,  the  ethical  questions  are  more  difficult.  When 
separate  economic  sectors  enter  the  picture,  and  in  particular  when  the 
rural  sector  is considered,  fundamental  problems  arise.  Almost  inevi- 
tably,  development  entails  the  transfer  of  resources  from  one  sector  to 
another;  certainly,  the  transfer  of  resources  from  agriculture  to  industry 
has  been  a classic  feature  of  the  development  process.  With  redistribu- 
tion  comes  the  end  of  voluntary  consent  as  a basis  for  justifying  coercive 
levies.  The challenge  then  arises  of  developing  a social  philosophy  that 
would  give  an ethical  foundation  for  forced  savings.  It iis  obvious  that 
we are  far  from  possessing  such  a doctrine.9 
The present  studies  do not dwell at great  length  on the special 
problems  of  agriculture  in  the  development  process,  however.  Rather, 
on  the  basis  of  the  materials  that  they  compile,  they  argue  the  general 
case.  They do so on two principal  grounds.  The authors  exhibit  a 
profound  skepticism  concerning  the  ability  of  the  governments  of  the 
developing  nations  to select  the  level  of  savings  and investment  that 
would  generate  an optimal  consumption  program.  Beckman,  for  ex- 
ample,  documents  the  near-disastrous  performance  of  the  Government 
of  Ghana  in  its  attempts  to  select  an appropriate  investment  program. 
More  strikingly  still,  virtually  all of  the  writers  query  the  willingness 
of  these  governments  to  select  a socially  optimal  development  program, 
as opposed  to  one  that  simply  maximizes  their  own  economic  advan- 
tage.  Naturally,  the  rural  dwellers  themselves  share  in  this  skepticism. 
With  the  growth  of  such  reservations,  the  consensual  basis  for  public 
savings  erodes.  The ethical  basis  for  coerced  levies  thus  remains  to  be 
established. 
One  debate  thus  revolves  around  the  issue  of  coercion  and  is  primarily 
concerned  with  the  encounter  between  the  peasants  and the  state.  An- 
other  focuses  primarily  on the  encounter  between  the  peasants  and  the 
market;  it  centers  on  the  issue  of  inequality.  The basic  question  is  com- 
pelling:  would  the  transformation  from  a subsistence  economy  to  one 
based  on  market  exchanges  receive  ethical  assent? 
The authors  of  these  studies  would  all agree  that  peasants  did not 
resist  the  intrusion  of the  market.  Acting  on the  basis  of perceived 
"  It has  been  argued  that  the  transfer  of  resources  out  of  agriculture  should  receive 
the  assent  of  the  rural  dwellers  themselves,  as they  or  their  descendants  will  share  in  the 
benefits  of  the  economic  growth  which  these  resources  engender.  But  this  argument  as- 
sumes  the  very  thing  whose  absence  made  coercion  inevitable  in the  first  place: the 
ability  of  a high  regard  for  the  welfare  of  future  generations  to  induce  voluntary  sav- 
ings.  In other  words,  it  ignores  the  public-goods  feature  of  the  welfare  of  future  gen- 
erations. 
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self-interest,  rural  dwellers  apparently  embraced  the  opportunities  ini- 
tiated  from  without.  The peasants  have  found,  in the  words  of  Dunn 
and Robertson,  the  results  to be both  "pleasant"  and "useful."  Ma- 
terially,  most  are  better  off.  But  are  they  morally  so?  Dunn  and  Robert- 
son  doubt  it.  And,  according  to  Scott,  many  of  the  peasants  themselves 
would  not  think  so either.  While  benefiting  from  the  market,  he  con- 
tends,  they  nonetheless  feel  morally  violated. 
At the  basis  of  the  arguments  of Scott,  Dunn and Robertson,  and 
others  are  questions  involving  self-interest,  ethics,  and the  distribution 
of  income.  Self-interest  instructs  that  when  you  see  your  opportunity  to 
become  better  off,  you  should  take  it.  But  ethics  places  requirements  on 
choices  made  in the  absence  of clear  information  about  where  one's 
self-interest  lies.  Scott  and Dunn and Robertson  argue  that,  before  the 
arrival  of  the  market,  peasants  lived  in an egalitarian  state  in which 
few,  if  any,  were  rich,  but  no one starved.  If  they  had been  told  that 
the  result  of  their  embracing  the  market  was that  inequality  would 
arise,  and  that  they  would  come  to  occupy  with  equal likelihood  any 
one of the positions  in the resultant  wide-ranging  distribution  of 
income,  would  they  have  chosen  to  enter  this  new  economic  order?  If, 
in  the  absence  of  knowledge  about  what  their  own  incomes  would  be, 
they  would  have  chosen  to enter,  then,  the  authors  appear  to argue, 
they  would  be behaving  morally.  But on what  grounds  would they 
have  made  such  a choice? 
Scott  offers  a model  for  such  a choice  that  is  near-Rawlsian  in  nature. 
To gain  the  approval  of  peasants,  he argues,  the  new economic  order 
must  insure  that  the  poorest  in  the  new  order  would  be  no  poorer  than 
he  had  been  in  the  society  that  guaranteed  his  subsistence.  Because  the 
world  market  offers  no such  guarantee,  Scott  argues,  it violates  the 
peasants'  sense  of  ethics.  Naturally,  there  are  other  viewpoints  on this 
matter.  Persons  insensitive  to the  difference  between  the  incomes  of 
the  very  rich  and the  very  poor  could  take  a utilitarian  view: if,  on 
average,  people  are  better  off  in  the  market  economy,  they  have  made 
a correct  choice  in  entering  it.  Economists  who  look  to  efficiency  as  the 
major  criterion  for  choice  would  be inclined  to take  such  a position. 
Another  criterion  could  be that  the  choice  would  be ethical  only  if, 
when  any  person  was  confronted  with  the  benefits  (or  lack  of  benefits) 
reaped  by  another,  he would be willing  to change  places  with  that 
other  person.  That is the  criterion  which  Dunn and Robertson  ap- 
parently  apply. 
Would the  transformation  from  a subsistence  economy  to  a market 
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economy  receive  ethical  assent?  The central  position  of  such  normative 
issues  in  this  literature  is  one  of  its  major  attractions. 
III.  SOME  CONFLICTS  RESOLVED 
I have  isolated  the  major  issues  that  underlie  the  literature  under 
examination  and that  dominate  much of the intellectual  discourse 
within  it.  In outlining  these  debates,  I have  noted  a variety  of  incon- 
sistencies.  Sometimes  these  arose  in the  form  of differing  viewpoints 
among  authors;  at  other  times  they  arose  as seeming  confusions  within 
the  writings  of  a single  author.  Taken together,  they  form  a series  of 
paradoxes  that  invite  exploration. 
There  can  be  no doubt  but  that  the  regimes  in the  developing  areas 
seek  to capture  major  portions  of the  profits  of peasant  production. 
They  maintain  a tariff  structure  that  in  effect  represents  a tax  on rural 
exports  for  the  world  market.  They  tax  exports  directly.  They  make 
numerous  levies  on  the  sale  of  cash  crops.  And  in  Senegal,  Ghana,  land 
Tanzania,  they  help  to  perpetuate  monopsonies  so as to  force  unfavor- 
able  prices  on  the  producers  and  thereby  capture  a major  portion  of  the 
gains  from  trade. 
Despite  all  this,  to  a surprising  degree,  the  peasants  have  not  made  the 
structure  of  taxation,  tariffs,  and prices  the  major  issues  in the  rural 
politics  of  these  areas.  Clearly,  for  a time  these  issues  were  important  in 
Ghana.  The Convention  People's  Party  (CPP)  initially  won votes  in 
the  cocoa  region  on  the  issue  of  cocoa  prices,  and  later  lost  votes  in  this 
region  when  it failed  to reverse  the  pricing  policies  of its  colonial 
predecessors.  What  is  striking,  however,  is  that  Ghana  appears  to  repre- 
sent  an  exception;  even  more  to  the  point,  the  CPP was,  still  later,  able 
to  break  the  opposition  in the  cocoa-growing  areas  even  while  it  con- 
tinued  to  implement  adverse  pricing  policies. 
Could  it  be  that,  having  been  systematically  bled  by  the  state,  the  rural 
dwellers  turned  apathetic?  Clearly,  no.  All of  the  studies  disclose  enor- 
mous  expenditures  of  political  energy.  Could  it  be that  they  are  not  as 
materially  inclined  as  we  would  have  it?  Again,  no.  The studies  reveal 
that  the  peasants  will fight  over  the  level  and pattern  of  government 
expenditure,  the  quantity  and location  of  public  projects,  jobs,  credit, 
and other  things  that  represent  the  material  spoils  of politics.  What 
would  appear  to  be  the  case  is  that  the  rural  dwellers  fail  to  attempt  to 
secure  collective  political  benefits  or  to  defend  their  collective  interest  as 
peasant  producers  for  the  world  market;  instead,  they  devote  their  ener- 
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gies  to  attempts  to  secure  disaggregated  and  divisible  benefits  from  the 
state.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  politicians  promote  this  kind  of  behavior. 
As  a result,  we  tend  to  see  the  politics  of  spoils  rather  than  the  politics 
of  class  action.s 
The  incentives  for  such  behavior  are  clear.  As  recent  works  by  Olson, 
Crenson,  Mayhew,  and  Fiorina  and  Noll  have  argued,  neither  producers 
nor  politicians  have  much  incentive  to  provide  collective  goods."  Poli- 
ticians  cannot  distribute  collective  benefits  to  their  supporters  while 
excluding  their  opponents;  collective  goods  are  thus  of  little  use  to  them 
in  building  political  coalitions.12  The  constituents,  moreover,  have  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  politicians  cannot  control  government  policies 
that  apply  to  the  development  strategies  of  the  nation  as a whole,  or 
that  affect  the  national  economic  structure  in  its  entirety;  their  political 
representative  represents  too  small  a fraction  of  the  government  to  have 
significant  influence  over  such  matters.  But,  on  issues  like  the  location 
of  roads,  bridges,  and  clinics-in  matters  of  spoils,  that  is-they  believe 
that  their  representative  should  be  decisive  in  determining  the  distribu- 
tion  of  these  things  within  their  constituencies.  Although  the  benefits 
from  tariff  reform  may  exceed  the  benefits  to  be  gained  by  the  digging 
of  a well,  the  expected  return  on  attempts  to  influence  the  representa- 
tive's  stand  on  the  latter  kind  of  issue  could  easily  exceed  the  expected 
returns  on  attempts  to  influence  his  position  on  such  matters  as  tariff 
policy.  There  is  thus  less  of  an  incentive  to  engage  in  influence  attempts 
in  the  areas  of  tariffs,  taxes,  or  pricing  policies  than  there  is  to  engage  in 
the  distribution  of  spoils.  And  the  consonance  in  the  incentives  facing 
10This  argument  appears  most  strongly  in O'Brien  (chaps.  3, 5, and 6), and Dunn 
and  Robertson  (chap.  8). 
"1Mancur Olson,  Jr.,  The Logic of Collective  Action  (Cambridge:  Harvard  Uni- 
versity  Press  i965);  Matthew  A. Crenson,  The Un-Politics  of  Air  Pollution  (Baltimore, 
Md.: The Johns  Hopkins  Press  I970);  David R. Mayhew,  Congress:  The Electoral 
Connection  (New Haven  and  London:  Yale University  Press  i974);  Morris  P. Fiorina, 
Congress:  Keystone  of  the  Washington  Establishment  (New Haven  and  London:  Yale 
University  Press  I977);  and  Morris  P. Fiorina  and  Roger  G. Noll,  "Voters,  Bureaucrats, 
and  Legislators:  A Rational  Choice  Perspective  on the  Growth  of  Bureaucracy"  (Cali- 
fornia  Institute  of Technology,  Social Science  Working  Paper  No. 159,  June  I977). 
The approach  is perhaps  most  completely  and convincingly  developed  by  Barry  Wein- 
gast  in  his  "A Representative  Legislature  and  Regulatory  Agency  Capture,"  Ph.D. diss. 
(California  Institute  of  Technology  I977). 
12In  parliamentary  systems,  the  party  in power  can clearly  behave  like the  single 
politican.  It controls  the  government,  even  though  it  does  not  hold  ioo  percent  of  the 
seats.  Manipulating  the  supply  of  divisible  benefits,  such  as schools  and clinics,  rather 
than  the  supply  of  collective  goods,  it  can  then  behave  like  a discriminating  monopolist 
and  provide  services  only  to  those  who  are  willing  to  vote  for  it.  As Dunn  and  Robert- 
son  show,  the  governing  CPP behaved  precisely  in  this  way  in  the  cocoa-growing  regions 
of  Ghana  and  so  broke  the  hold  of  the  political  opposition  (chap.  8,  and  esp.  pp.  327  ff.). 
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politicians  and  the  electorate  may  be  sufficient  to  displace  the  former  set 
of  issues  with  the  latter  on  the  rural  political  agenda. 
Vigorous  political  competition  continues;  resources  are  channeled 
into  the  countryside  in  the  form  of  public  projects;  and  the  basic  policies 
that  determine  the  collective  standing  of  the  peasantry  remain  largely 
off  the  political  agenda,  with  the  result  that  the  peasants  remain  poor. 
The  diverse  images  of  the  state  as  monolith  and  as  arena  for  political 
competition;  of  peasants  as victims  and  as beneficiaries;  of  political 
action  and  lack  of  reward;  of  peasants  as  rational  political  actors,  and 
as  losers  in  the  political  economies  of  the  new  nations-these  conflicting 
images  appear  to  be  reconcilable  when  the  significance  of  the  distinction 
between  purely  public  goods  and divisible  public  benefits  is recog- 
nized.13 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper,  I have  explored  the  dominant  topics  that  characterize 
micro-level  studies  of  rural  behavior  in  the  developing  nations.  In so 
doing,  I have  examined  the  relationship  of  the  rural  communities  to 
the  state  and  to  the  market.  I have  also  looked  within  the  rural  sector 
and  examined  the  structure  of  rural  communities,  the  way  in  which  that 
structure  influences  the  allocation  of  resources,  and  the  variety  of  models 
of  individual  behavior  that  have  been  applied  to  the  study  of  peasants. 
I have  also  discussed  some  of  the  ethical  issues  that  arise  in  the  literature, 
and  attempted  'to  resolve  some  of  the  basic  dilemmas  that  intrude  so 
strikingly  at  a variety  of  points. 
Obviously,  this  new  literature  is securely  launched.  It has  already 
established  a coherent  set  of  interests,  provoked  well-focused  debates, 
and  investigated  in  depth  several  regions  of  the  world  whose  economic 
fortunes  influence  the  world  markets  in  agriculture  and  whose  political 
fortunes  have  affected  us  all.  In  addition,  it  has  given  rise  to  a series  of 
topics  for  further  investigation;  these  topics  constitute  the  research 
agenda  of  this  emerging  genre. 
Relationships  with  the  state  and  the  market:  The  relationship  between 
the  rural  sector  and  the  state  has  barely  been  examined.  The  developing 
nations  are  overwhelmingly  rural  in  makeup.  Why  do politicians  in 
these  nations  so  often  choose  policy  positions  that  appear  to  violate  the 
interests  of  a vast  majority  of  their  citizens?  In  the  developed  nations, 
13 Perhaps  the  seminal  statement  of  this  distinction  is  contained  in  Theodore  J.  Lowi, 
"American  Business,  Public  Policy,  Case-Studies,  and  Political  Theory,"  World  Politics, 
xvi (July  i964), 677-7I5. 
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farmers  are  a minority  and yet  are  subsidized  by  the  state;  in the  de- 
veloping  world,  they  are  a majority  and yet  appear  on balance  to  be 
heavily  taxed.  What  explains  this  paradox? 
With  respect  to the  rural  dwellers'  encounter  with  the  market,  I 
would  advocate  giving  up on the  interminable  debate  about  which  is 
more  important-what  is  given  ulp  in  the  market  or  what  is  received  in 
exchange.  More  meaningful,  surely,  are  empirical  investigations  of  the 
actual  distribution  of  the  gains  from  peasant  production.  As part  of 
their  micro-studies,  scholars  should  investigate  such  subjects  as  the  struc- 
ture  and organization  of  rural  markets,  the  system  and incidence  of 
taxation,  shifts  in  the  terms  of  trade  between  agricultural  and  industrial 
products,  and  changes  in the  levels,  sources,  and terms  of  agricultural 
credit.  Equally  as  important,  they  should  analyze  the  manner  in  which 
the  political  system  is  used  to  determine  these  things. 
it  should  be noted  that,  in studying  the  market,  all of  the  books  re- 
strict  themselves  to the market  for  produce  but largely  ignore  the 
market  for  labor.  That is a major  omission,  for  in many  of  the  rural 
communities,  immigrants  represent  a major  political  faction.  Urban 
migrants  often  return  to  these  communities  with  new  political  prefer- 
ences,  and  frequently  organize  to  promote  their  political  ideals.  More- 
over,  the  fact  that  emigration  is  possible  places  a lower  bound  on the 
level  of  political  and economic  exploitation  that  can be achieved  by 
rural  elites;  variations  in  the  attractiveness  of  this  option  thus  can  help 
to  account  for  variations  in the  level  of  exploitation  achieved  by  rural 
elites  in  different  peasant  communities. 
Relationships  within  the  peasant  communities:  From contributors 
with  anthropological  interests,  we  have  a sense  of  the  structure  of  rural 
communities  in  the  developing  nations;  from  those  more  committed  to 
traditional  political  science,  we have  a sense  of the  national  political 
structures.  Following  in the footsteps  of Barrows  and O'Brien,  we 
should  examine  the  political  alliances  between  local  and  national  elites 
and the  material  considerations  that  bind  such  coalitions.  Even  more, 
we need  to  investigate  the  manner  in which  the  rural  elites  represent 
(or fail  to  represent)  the  interests  of  their  clients  in the  bureaucratic 
process  of  policy  formation,  particularly  in  the  areas  of  planning,  taxa- 
tion,  and  public  expenditure.  We know  surprisingly  little  about  interest- 
group  politics,  insofar  as they  affect  agricultural  production  in Third- 
World  nations. 
Given  the  variety  of  models  of  peasant  behavior  that  are  now avail- 
able,  we  need  a further  elaboration  and  testing  of  them.  For  example,  a 
model  of  utility  maximization  is vacuous  until  it specifies  the  objects 
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that  give  people  satisfaction,  and the  relative  weight  they  place  upon 
them;  the  variety  of  local  peasant  cultures  will  allow  the  development 
of  a variety  of  different  specifications.  Similarly,  "safety  first"  models 
are  also  vacuous  until  they  specify  the  nature  of  the  minimum  which 
people  seek  to  protect  and the  degree  to  which  they  seek  such  protec- 
tion.  A more  complete  working-out  of  these  models,  and  the  beginnings 
of  some  rigorous  testing,  represent  obvious  next  steps  in the  literature. 
In the  investigation  of  ethical  considerations,  it  is  clear  that  perhaps 
the  most  attractive  direction  in  which  to  move  is  the  one  staked  out  by 
Scott:  the  investigation  of  the  peasants'  own  ethical  systems.  After  all, 
it  is their  conceptions  of  justice,  fairness,  equity,  and due process  that 
will  largely  determine  their  response  to  the  forced  levies  and  economic 
redistributions  which inevitably  occur as part of the development 
process. 
This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Mon, 19 May 2014 11:29:50 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions